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SOME PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACT 
AS PROMISE 
Randy E. Barnett t 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 
Despite the fond hopes of generations of legal scholars and ac-
tivists, freely negotiated and enforceable contracts still govern the 
bulk of commercial relations in this country-particularly large com-
plex commercial relations as opposed to consumer transactions. 
Law professors have to search pretty hard to find appellate cases 
that can be touted as harbingers of a contract-free future. 
I want to begin this presentation by acknowledging the impor-
tant role that Allan Farnsworth has played in keeping contract alive. 
Professor Farnsworth is without doubt the preeminent living Ameri-
can contracts authority. His principal contributions include theRe-
statement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"), 1 for which he was 
the reporter, and his masterful treatise on contracts.2 These two 
projects testify to the fact that one person can make a difference in 
the development of law; they have been the doctrinal glue holding 
the rules and principles of modern contract law together against a 
siege of anti-contract ideology coming from academia. Additionally, 
I would be unfair to Allan were I to neglect his theoretically in-
sightful law review articles, particularly those concerning contrac-
tual interpretation. 3 
If the goal of this symposium was to hear from two contract law 
professors with diametrically opposing views, then I am afraid that 
the organizers erred in inviting Professor Farnsworth and myself. 
This is not to say, however, that I have no disagreements with Pro-
fessor Farnsworth. I do. In this essay, I shall try to explain why, 
although contract thankfully still lives in practice, the prevailing the-
ory of contract that has been promoted by Professor Farnsworth 
and others is deficient in that it leaves contract law vulnerable to 
t Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Chicago-Kent College ofl..aw. 
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). 
2 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (1990). 
3 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
"Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE LJ. 939 (1967). 
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being undermined in the ways that, for example, Walter Olson de-
scribes in his contribution to this symposium. 4 
In particular, mainstream contract theory is dominated by the 
conception of"contract as promise," or what 1 shall call the promise 
theory of contracts. From the Second Restatement to Contract as 
Promise 5 by Charles Fried, it is widely assumed that the basis of en-
forcing contracts is related to the obligation one has to keep one's 
promises.6 According to this theory, one looks to the institution of 
promising to see why, and therefore when, commitments should be 
legally enforceable. This is hardly a new development. The prom-
ise theory of contract achieved preeminence through the efforts of 
Harvard Law School Professor Samuel Williston in his famous trea-
tise7 and in the first Restatement of Contracts ("First Restatement").8 
(You might say that Professor Williston was the Allan Farnsworth of 
his day.) 
Now I realize that to many the promise theory may seem not 
only to be obviously correct, but one cannot immediately imagine 
an acceptable alternative to it. Certainly, it seems preferable to the 
detrimental reliance theory of contract promoted by those heralding 
the "Death of Contract. " 9 And I freely admit that the promise the-
ory has its attractions-particularly if one assesses, as I do, the vital-
ity of contract by the extent to which a legal system implements the 
classical liberal conception of justice, 10 a central principle of which 
is freedom of contract. Freedom of contract has two distinct dimen-
sions: The first-freedom from contract-stipulates that persons 
should not have contractual obligations imposed on them without 
their consent. The second-freedom to contract-stipulates that 
4 See Walter Olson, Tortification of Contract Law: Displacing Consent and Agreement, 77 
CoRNELL L. REv. 1043 (1992). 
5 See CHARLEs FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CoNTRACTUAL 0BUGA-
TION (1981). 
6 This does not mean that a promise theory is necessarily a "will theory" which 
bases contractual obligation on the promisor's subjective will to be bound. Promises 
may also be thought to create obligation because other persons have or are likely to rely 
upon them to their detriment. For a discussion of the various theories that have been 
advanced to justify contractual obligation, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Con-
tract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 271-91 (1986) (critically evaluating will, reliance, efficiency, 
fairness, and bargain theories of contractual obligation). 
7 SAMUEL W. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS (1st ed. 1920). 
8 8 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1928). Williston was the Reporter for the First 
Restatement. 
9 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT (1974). For a discussion of some 
of the difficulties with this theory, see Barnett, supra note 6, at 274-77; Randy E. Barnett 
& Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estappel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresen-
tations, 15 HoFSTRA L. REv. 443 (1987). 
10 I discuss the social function of the liberal conception of justice in Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 62 
(1992). 
1024 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1022 
persons should have the power to alter by consent their legal rela-
tions. 11 The promise theory has been salutary to both aspects of 
freedom of contract to some degree. 
The promise theory views the origin of contract in the making 
of a promise. 12 This means that it views the creation of contracts as 
arising, in an important part, from the voluntary acts of promisors 
rather than from third parties like the State. In this regard, the the-
ory facilitates the classical liberal value of freedom to contract. The 
promise theory also supports the notion that contracts should be 
interpreted according to the terms of the promise rather than by 
imposing terms on the parties. In this regard, the theory facilitates 
the classical liberal value of freedom from contract. These strengths 
of the promise theory are why I credit Professor Farnsworth--one of 
the leading proponents of this theory of contract-with helping to 
keep contract alive. By promoting the promise theory so effectively, 
he has helped bolster both freedom from and freedom to contract. 
Yet the promise theory is not without its difficulties, though 
these difficulties are complex and hard to explain concisely. With 
this caveat in mind, however, and at the risk of substantial oversim-
plification, I shall attempt to summarize some of the problems that 
arise from adhering to a promise theory of contract. 
I 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PROMISE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT 
Serious problems with the promise theory begin the moment 
we seek a rationale for enforcing promises. The problem for which 
the promise theory is supposed to be the solution is to figure out 
exactly why it is that contracts are legally enforceable (and, there-
fore, which commitments should be enforced). That is, we are con-
cerned, not with why persons ought to keep their word, but with 
why and therefore when coercion may be used by third parties, in-
cluding the State, to compel promisors either to perform or pay 
damages when they fail to keep their word. The best-known an-
swers to the question of legal enforceability provided by the prom-
ise theory are often either highly moralistic or tort-like in nature. 
11 For a discussion of these principles and the important social functions they per-
form, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). 
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise 
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 11, at 4 
("[T]he law of contracts is confined to promises.") (emphasis added). 
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Professor Fried, for example, has argued that the obligation to 
keep one's promises is a moral one: 
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he 
has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give 
grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised 
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to 
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that 
confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared 
social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust. 13 
But a moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have 
courts enforcing purely moral commitments, which is tantamount to 
legislating virtue. Such an open-ended rationale leads to serious 
problems for the value of freedom of contract. First, it commits 
courts to enforcing promissory commitments that the parties them-
selves may never have contemplated as "contractual" or legally en-
forceable, thereby undermining the value of freedom from contract. 
Second, once the moral behavior of the promissor is deemed rele-
vant to the issue of enforceability, the promise theory also appears 
to make relevant to the issue of enforcement other moral aspects of 
the promisor's behavior that may argue against enforcement, 
thereby undermining the value of freedom to contract. In this man-
ner, the common-law rights of contract can come to resemble the 
judicial discretion of a court of equity. 
Another popular justification of the promise theory looks at the 
promise from the direction of the promisee. That is, persons may 
be compelled to perform or pay damages because others have relied 
or are likely to rely upon a promise to their detriment.14 This was 
the rationale for contract law apparently favored by Fuller and Per-
due in their famous article The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 15-
although, as evidenced by his later article, Consideration and Form, 16 
Lon Fuller himself never took an injurious reliance theory as far as 
the many subsequent law professors who so admire his earlier path-
breaking work. When the enforceability of promises is justified in 
this way the promise theory is but a short step away from a detri-
mental reliance theory. That is, once the injury suffered by the 
promisee is made the principal rationale for enforcing promises, we 
13 FRIED, supra note 5, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
14 See, e.g.,Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV. 
678 (1984);Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. 
REV. 1373. 
15 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 
YALE LJ. 373 (1936-1937). 
16 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941). In this arti-
cle, Fuller makes clear that he considers private autonomy to be a vital part of any com-
plete account of contractual obligation. 
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end up with the following very tort-like theory of contract: Just as 
tort actions compensate persons injured by physical conduct, con-
tract actions compensate persons injured by verbal promissory con-
duct. In such an approach, either dimension of freedom of contract 
plays little, if any, role. In sum, this way of justifying the promise 
theory ultimately transforms it into the detrimental reliance theory, 
which undermines rather than supports contract as a distinct type of 
consensual obligation within the liberal conception of justice. 
Even the efficiency rationale for the promise theory provided by 
law-and-economics scholars creates problems. According to this 
view, an exchange of promises (bargains) is enforceable because 
both parties are made better off ex ante. 17 Sole reliance on this ra-
tionale creates two problems. First, it apparently permits promises 
to go unenforced whenever it can be shown that factors such as une-
qual bargaining power or disparities of information undermine the 
normal assumption of mutual ex ante gain. 18 Second, it enables 
some to ask why the efficacy of contracts should be assessed accord-
ing to the ex ante benefits rather than some assessment of ex post fair-
ness of the exchange. Why is the perspective of the parties before 
the exchange occurs the most appropriate point in a transaction to 
assess whether someone is made better or worse off by an 
exchange? 
Yet another serious problem for freedom of contract is created 
by the promise theory's exclusive focus on promises once it is con-
ceded, as it must be, that many real-world contract law problems 
arise precisely because parties have unavoidably left "gaps" in their 
promises. Some theorists argue that other nonpromissory princi-
ples must be used to determine the "gap-filling" rules of contract 
law. 19 According to Charles Fried, who takes exactly this position, 
where gaps exist in a contract, "the court is forced to sort out the 
difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but actu-
ally have not. The one basis on which these cases cannot be re-
solved is on the basis of the agreement-that is, of contract as 
promise."20 While Fried, perhaps reluctantly, concedes this point, 
other theorists who are quite hostile to viewing consent as central to 
1 7 Of course, the law-and-economics analysis of contract is considerably richer and 
more complex than this simple proposition. See generally RICHARD A. PoSNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAw 79-123 (3d ed. 1986). 
18 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 
741, 750 (1982) ("The argument based on the efficiency of contract price is fully effec-
tive only to the extent that the relevant market does not materially differ from a perfectly 
competitive market. ln fact, however, many contracts are made in markets that are 
highly imperfect."). 
19 See Barnett, supra note I I. 
20 FRIED, supra note 5, at 60. 
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contract law-such as relational theorists Ian Macneil21 and Peter 
Linzer22_exalt in this view. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, some law-and-economics scholars 
have adopted the same argument.23 Because the problem ofprom-
issory gaps is pervasive, the promise theory implicitly legitimizes a 
variety of gap-filling rules based not on the parties' explicit or im-
plicit consent, but on any policy or principle a court or legislature 
may happen to prefer. As Richard Craswell has argued, "[d]ebates 
over the question of why promises are binding ... do much less 
than is commonly supposed to settle the role to be played by effi-
ciency, non-economic values, or ethical theories generally in select-
ing contract law's background rules."24 
II 
SOME ADVANTAGES OF A CONSENT THEORY OF CONTRACT 
What alternative is there to the promise theory that can capture 
its advantages while avoiding its drawbacks? I favor an updated ver-
sion of the older view of contract that seeks to distinguish between 
enforceable and unenforceable promises by looking to see if the 
parties to an agreement manifested their intention to create or alter 
their legal relations. According to this approach, the factor that 
must accompany a promise and that justifies substantial reliance 
upon a promise is the existence of a manifested intention to create legal 
relations or, to use another common formulation, a manifested intention 
to be legally bound. 25 
I have called this the consent theory of contract. 26 According to 
a consent theory (and here I simplify the theory considerably), 
21 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. 
REv. 589, 593 ( 1974) ("When the guise of ... consensually formed law was not possible, 
... the system filled the gaps by supplying presentation in the form of predictable and 
theoretically precise rules."). For a more extensive presentation of Macneil's views of 
consent and my critique, see Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Mac-
neil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming August 1992). 
22 See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 139; Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract'!-Replying to Four 
Critics, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 213. 
23 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). 
24 Id. at 528. For my reply to Craswell, see Barnett, supra note 11 at 874-97. 
25 Although these two formulations are adequate for most purposes, for reasons 
that are beyond the scope of this essay, they are not completely accurate. A more com-
plete expression of the principle would be that contractual obligation arises when a 
person "voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally en-
forceable obligation by transferring alienable rights." Barnett, supra note 6, at 300. 
26 In addition to the articles already cited, see Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining 
Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y (forthcoming 1992) Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External 
Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undis-
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promises and other types of commitments ought to be legally en-
forceable if they are made in such a way as to convey to a promisee 
the message that the promisor intends to be held legally accounta-
ble for nonperformance. This message can be conveyed formally-
for example, by a signed waiver of tort liability that is written in a 
manner that is intelligible to the person signing it. 27 Or it can be 
conveyed informally, as done on every commodities exchange in the 
world. 28 Regardless of how this message is conveyed, without it a 
promise does not create an enforceable contractual obligation. 29 
With this message, a promise is presumptively enforceable as a 
contract. 30 
For example, when I promised Janice Calabresi that I would 
take part in this symposium, I certainly did not intend to subject 
myself to legal sanctions should I for some reason fail to participate. 
Nor do I think that, while she certainly relied on my promise, Janice 
could reasonably have believed that I had consented to assume any 
contractual obligation to appear. Although she may have judged me 
harshly for withdrawing as a participant, both she and I would con-
sider it to be the height of injustice if I were to be sued for breach of 
contract. Something more formal or more explicit than our phone 
conversation would have had to occur to rebut the normal presump-
tion that a promise to speak is not legally binding on the speaker, 
although I have no doubt that there is a court somewhere that 
would disagree. 
If the promise theory-whether based on the moral rationale of 
promise-keeping, on the rationale of injurious reliance, or on some 
other rationale-is the predominant view of the twentieth century, 
the consent theory, whose roots go back centuries, was probably the 
predominant contract theory of the nineteenth century (although it 
is a bit difficult to be sure about this since so much of legal theory in 
that period was implicit rather than explicit). The view that Willis-
ton needed to argne against and which he and others eventually de-
feated when they succeeded in making promise-keeping the focal 
closed Agency With Contract Theory, CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, Contract 
Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 179 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Con-
tract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1223 (1984). A 
condensed and revised account of this approach appears in Randy E. Barnett, Rights and 
Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: EssAYS IN LAw 
AND MoRALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds., 1991). 
27 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 310-12. 
28 See id. at 312-17. See also Barnett & Becker, supra note 9. 
29 However, such conduct could still give rise to legal liability sounding in tort or 
restitution, provided the requirements of these types of liability are present. 
30 Because consent is only presumptively binding, other circumstances such as du-
ress, fraud, and incapacitation, if established, could rebut the presumption and defeat a 
claim for contractual enforcement. See Barnett, supra note 6, at 309-10, 318-19. 
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point of contract theory, was stated by Professor Ernest Lorenzen in 
1919: "Agreements which are physically possible and legally per-
missible should, on principle, be enforceable ... if it was the inten-
tion of the parties to assume legal relations."31 Williston's triumph 
over this view was reflected in section 20 of the First Restatement 
which stated that: "neither ... the mental assent to the promises in 
the contract nor real or apparent intention that the promises shall be legally 
binding is essential [to contract formation]."32 This position was 
adopted in section 21 of the Second Restatement, which states that 
"neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally bind-
ing is essential to the formation of a contract. . . . "33 
By arguing, as 1 have in my writings on contract, that consent-
a manifested intention to be legally bound-is the key to distin-
guishing enforceable from unenforceable promises, I do not mean 
to suggest that courts should simply look for this intention un-
guided by general rules and principles. 1 suspect that a direct pur-
suit of these intentions on a case-by-case basis would likely lead to 
more injustice from the standpoint of consent than it would avoid. 
To the contrary, the bargain requirement of consideration that plays 
a pivotal role in both the First and Second Restatements, and which 
states that mutually inducing promises are presumptively enforcea-
ble, is an excellent, though far from perfect,34 criterion of consen-
sual obligation precisely because the existence of a bargain so 
frequently corresponds to the existence of a manifested intention to 
be legally bound. This means that, in practice, there is often very 
little difference between a promise theory as embodied in the Re-
statement and a consent theory. 
Still, an exclusive focus on either bargained-for consideration 
or detrimental reliance, or both, as criteria of contractual obligation 
creates serious problems of underenforcement and overenforce-
ment. By this I mean a failure to enforce consensual commitments 
that should be enforced and the enforcement of commitments to 
which the parties did not consent and therefore should not be en-
forced. The problem of underenforcement is the concern of those 
contributors to this symposium, such as Walter Olson,35 who com-
plain that consensual commitments to waive tort liability and to as-
31 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE LJ. 
621, 646 (1919). 
32 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1928) (emphasis added). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 21 (1981). This proposition is qualified 
somewhat, however, by the further stipulation that "a manifestation of intention that a 
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract." Id. 
(emphasis added). This may represent a subtle shift in the direction of consent theory. 
34 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 287-91; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9. 
35 See Olson, supra note 4. 
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sume greater than normal risks of harm are held to be 
unenforceable no matter how demonstrable or knowledgeable may 
be the exercise of consent by a person assuming such a risk. In this 
manner, the ability of persons to exercise freedom to contract and 
avoid the hazards of the ton-law system of negligence is under-
mined, as Peter Huber and Walter Olson have so graphically de-
scribed in their writings. s6 
Consider for a moment the more neglected problem of the 
overenforcement of promises. One famous example of over-
enforcement engendered, at least in part, by the promise theory of 
contract, is the case of Texaco v. Pennzoil.87 Texaco was accused of 
having tortiously interfered with a contract that allegedly existed be-
tween the Getty Foundation and Pennzoil. Texaco argued, in pan, 
that there was no contract between Getty and Pennzoil for it to in-
terfere with. So, an important issue in the case was whether or not a 
contract existed between Getty and Pennzoil. 
The Texas Court of Appeals took the view that whether a con-
tract existed or not depended on whether the parties "intended to 
be bound"88 to the agreement they had apparently reached. 
Although this formulation sounds like a consent theory standard of 
"manifested intention to be legally bound," it could simply be an-
other way of saying that one has made a promise. According to the 
Second Restatement, "[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act 
or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a 
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made. "89 
While I have no quarrel with this definition of a promise, it im-
plies that everyone who makes a promise is "binding" themselves in 
some siguificant sense. Surely, I "bound" myself to come to Wash-
ington to give this presentation insofar as I gave Janice Calabresi 
reason to believe that I had made a "commitment" to attend, even 
though (in my opinion at least) I did not manifest an intention to be 
legally bound. Although they never squarely address the matter in 
Texaco v. Pennzoil, the Texas trial and appellate courts appear to have 
viewed the crucial issue to be whether or not a promise had been 
made. They concluded that sufficient evidence of a promise existed 
to justify the jury's verdict. If, however, any promise that was made 
by Getty to Pennzoil was not apparently intended to be legally bind-
:36 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQ.UENCES 
(1988); WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). 
:37 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App. 1987). 
:38 /d. at 789 ("The issue of when the parties intended to be bound is a fact question 
to be decided from the parties' acts and communications."). 
:39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981). 
1992] CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1031 
ing, then from the perspective of the liberal principle of freedom 
from contract, this case is an instance of overenforcement. 
Another recent case provides an intriguing example of a court 
attempting to use something like a consent theory of contract, 
rather than a promise theory, to decide whether a promise should 
be enforced and to prevent overenforcement. This is the Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co. 40 case, which has become well-known (and was re-
versed by the Supreme Court of the United States)41 because the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that enforcing a promise of confi-
dentiality of a reporter to her source violated the First Amendment. 
For present purposes, the more interesting issue in the case is the 
contract law issue entirely avoided by the United States Supreme 
Court but considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court. This is the 
question of whether the promise of confidentiality made by a news-
paper reporter to a source was properly enforceable according to 
contract law rather than according to the First Amendment. The 
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by 
observing: 
A contract, it is said, consists of an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. Here, we seemingly have all three, plus a breach. 
We think, however, the matter is not this simple. 
Unquestionably, the promises given in this case were in-
tended by the promisors to be kept .... 
The question before us, however, is not whether keeping a 
confidential promise is ethically required but whether it is legally 
enforceable; whether, in other words, the law should superimpose 
a legal obligation on a moral and ethical obligation. The two obli-
gations are not always coextensive.42 
After noting that "in this case . . . we have a clear-cut prom-
ise,"43 the Minnesota Supreme Court went on to offer a consent the-
ory rationale for nonenforcement: 
The law ... does not create a contract where the parties in-
tended none. . . . Nor does the law consider binding every ex-
change of promises .... We are not persuaded that in the special 
milieu of media newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily 
believe that they are engaged in making a legally binding contract. 
They are not thinking in terms of offers and acceptances in any 
commercial or business sense. The parties understand that the 
40 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990). 
41 ll1 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
42 457 N.W.2d at 202-03. 
43 !d. at 203. 
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reporter's promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment, 
but a moral obligation alone will not support a contract. ... 44 
The court then concluded: 
In other words, contract law seems here an ill fit for a promise 
of news source confidentiality. To impose a contract theory on 
this arrangement puts an unwarranted legal rigidity on a special 
ethical relationship, precluding necessary consideration of factors 
underlying that ethical relationship. We conclude that a con-
tract cause of action is inappropriate for these particular 
circumstances. 45 
Of course, one can disagree about whether, on the facts of the 
case, the parties had or had not actually manifested an intention to 
be legally bound. But, the dissenters focused their fire not on the 
evidence of intent to be bound, but instead on the majority's im-
plicit rejection of the promise theory, which maintains that the issue 
of intent to create contractual relations is irrelevant to contract for-
mation. Justice Yetka argued: 
The simple truth of the matter is that the appellants made a prom-
ise of confidentiality to Cohen in consideration for information 
they considered newsworthy. That promise was broken and, as a 
direct consequence, Cohen lost his job. Under established rules 
of contract law, the appellants should be responsible for the con-
sequences of that broken promise.46 
Justice Kelly, in dissent, explicitly advocated the promise theory: 
I remain unpersuaded by the majority's analysis that, notwith-
standing that all the elements of a legal contract and its breach are 
here present, the contract is unenforceable because "the parties 
intended none." It reaches this conclusion even as it concedes 
that the promises given by the agents and employees of these de-
fendants was [sic] intended by them to be kept.4 7 
1n sum; both dissenting opinions accepted the conventional ap-
proach that a promise is actionable whether or not it is accompanied 
by a manifested intention to be legally bound. Their passionate dis-
sents on this issue support my interpretation that the majority had 
in its opinion implicitly rejected the promise theory and, perhaps 
unwittingly, embraced a consent theory. 
44 I d. Notice how this language rejects the moral theory of "contract as promise" 
offered by Charles Fried. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 205. Notice that justice Yetka's language implicitly relies on the injurious 
reliance rationale for enforcing promises. 
4 7 /d. at 206. Of course, had the promisors not intended to keep the promise at the 
time they made it, the legal theory would have been fraud, not breach of contract. See 
Barnett & Becker, supra note 9, at 485-95. 
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Ultimately, however, the majority made the telling theoretical 
mistake of considering the plaintiff's promissory estoppel argument 
as wholly unrelated to the issue of intent to contract.48 By holding 
that the First Amendment, rather than the lack of contractual con-
sent, barred a promissory estoppel cause of action, the stage was set 
for the Supreme Court reversal that eventually occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Those who are interested in maintaining the life of contract 
should take an interest in the theories of contract that are discussed 
in the law schools. It is not enough to lambast the courts for reach-
ing results that one intuitively finds absurd. One must also burrow 
beneath the results to find the flaw in the theory or doctrine that 
produced the outcome. For, until we discover the theoretical or 
doctrinal error, we can never be completely sure that it is the result 
rather than our intuitions that are mistaken. 
The promise theory has been accepted for decades because it 
comports with some of our most basic intuitions about contractual 
obligations. Unfortunately, where it deviates from these intuitions, 
the promise theory has led to results and doctrines that have under-
mined the centrality of consent in contract law and theory. A con-
sent theory of contract preserves much of what is intuitively 
appealing about the promise theory while incorporating many of the 
results and doctrines upon which opponents of consent have based 
their theories. In this way, a consent theory of contract transcends 
the limitations of the promise theory, and thereby helps to preserve 
the twin liberal values of freedom from and freedom to contract. 
48 For an analysis of promissory estoppel from the perspective of contractual con-
sent, see Barnett, supra note 6; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9. 
